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Individual Control Over Personal Grievances
Under Vaca v. Sipes
Last term, in a case involving a suit brought by an employee against
his union, the Supreme Court set out the conditions under which an em-
ployee may sue his employer for breach of the collective agreement. In
Vaca v. Sipes the Court held that an employee whose union chose not to
press his claim to arbitration cannot litigate the underlying contract
claim in court unless he can show that the union acted in breach of its
duty of fair representation.' The practical impact of this is to handicap
if not hamstring the aggrieved employee, however meritorious his claim
against his employer, because of the difficulty of showing his union's bad
faith. The analysis which follows will attempt to show that no public or
private interest justifies the imposition of such a burden on the em-
ployee and that neither common law principles nor the relevant statu-
tory provision dictates the Court's conclusion.
Vaca was brought by an employee who had been denied reinstate-
ment to his former position on the ground that his high blood pressure
made him physically unfit for the heavy manual work required by his job.
Dissatified, the employee asked his union to process his grievance. On
the basis of medical evidence supplied by his physician, the union took
the case to the fourth stage of the grievance procedure established under
the collective bargaining agreement, but at each stage the company de-
nied reinstatement on the strength of its own medical examinations. In
order to decide whether to press the grievance to arbitration, the union
arranged and paid for an independent examination of the employee.
The examination supported the company's position, and the union ac-
cordingly refused to bring the matter to arbitration. Denied the oppor-
tunity to arbitrate his claim, the employee commenced two suits in the
Missouri state courts: the first against the union for damages, and the
second against the company for breach of contract.-2 At the trial of the
1. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). Strictly speaking, the discussion of the Court on the requisites
for a suit by the individual against his employer could be regarded as dicta, despite the
extensive attention given to them in the opinion, since the employer was not a party. to
the instant proceedings. Indeed that is the position adopted in the concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Fortas. 386 U.S. at 200. But since Afr. Justice White, writing for a majority
of the Court, and Mr. Justice Black in dissent, proceed on the contrary assumption,
386 U.S. at 185, 203-04, no lower court is likely to depart from this rationale.
2. 'While it is dear that the action of the employee against his employer is a Section
301 action, Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), it is much more difficult so
to characterize the action of the employee against his union, since the obligation in ques-
tion is created by statute and not by the collective agreement. Section 301(a) reads as
follows:
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action against the union, the employee's claim of improper dismissal
was vindicated by a jury verdict against the union.3 The trial judge set
the verdict aside on the ground that since the subject matter of the case
arguably constituted an unfair labor practice, jurisdiction rested exclu-
sively with the NLRB. While the appeal was pending the employee
died, and the name of Sipes, the administrator of his estate, was substitu-
ted for his own. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the decision,4 re-
instating the verdict, and the case was brought to the Supreme Court on
a writ of certiorari.5 After holding that the state court had jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court in turn reversed the Missouri court on the ground
that the union's decision had been made in good faith and hence the
employee could not as a matter of law recover from his union.
Insofar as the decision of the Court restates the proposition that
union liability turns solely on the breach of fair representation, it has
not altered federal labor law. But the elaborate discussion in J'aca con-
cluding that the employee cannot maintain an action for breach of con-
tract against the employer unless he can show that his union breached
its duty of fair representation is at once more novel and more controver-
sial. The duty of fair representation requires only that the union refrain
from acting arbitrarily, discriminatorily or maliciously toward the em-
ployee; in short, it requires only that the union act in good faith., The
effect of Vaca, therefore, is that unless the union displays bad faith, the
employee, even if discharged in breach of the collective agreement, has
no remedy whatever against either the union or the employer.
This state of affairs can best be evaluated by contrasting it with the al-
ternatives which could be constructed. The Court, having decided to
treat the issue, could have held that the employee could sue his employer
(a) Venue, amount, and citizenship. Suits for violation of Contracts between an em-
ployer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting com-
merce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of
the parties.
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 501(a) [hereinafter cited as
L.M.R.A.] 29 U.S.C. 185(a) (1964). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, consistent with the
expansive interpretation given Section 301(a) in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
853 U.S. 448 (1957), appears to treat the action against the union as a Section 301 action,
whether or not the employer is joined in the cause. 386 U.S. at 187.
3. The courts below appeared to treat the question of improper dismissal as deterinia,
tive of the question of the union's bad faith. 386 U.S. at 189.
4. Sipes v. Vaca, 897 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1965).
5. 384 U.S. 969 (1966).
6. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). "A wide ralnge of
reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit It
represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise
of its discretion."
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in court for a breach of the collective agreement without regard to the
grievance machinery provided by the contract. Or, on a principle analo-
gous to the principle of exhaustion of available remedies, the Court
could have required the employee to press his claim as far as possible
within the private grievance machinery-i.e., until the union refused to
further pursue his grievance against the employer.- A more extreme so-
lution, although one not readily suggested to the Court by the framing
of the issues in Vacawould be to allow the individual employee to press
his own grievance, if necessary to arbitration, within whatever private
settlement process the collective agreement provided; this right could
be made absolute or conditional upon the refusal of the union to pro-
cess the grievance further."
These alternatives differ as to the time at which and forum in which
the individual employee would be allowed to pursue his claim against
the employer for a breach of the collective agreement. As the later anal-
ysis will show, these variables of time and place affect the relative desir-
ability of each alternative and the ease with which each could be assimi-
lated to the existing framework of labor law. All the alternatives can,
however, be grouped together as choices which would at some point al-
low the individual to process and pursue his own grievance against the
employer. This categorization is profitable because Vaca v. Sipes stands
for precisely the opposite rule: the employee must rely on his union to
represent his interests, and absent specific malfeasance by his union he
may not secure an adjudication of any claim he may have against his em-
ployer either through internal grievance machinery or in court.
The subordination of the individual interest to union control in Vaca
is patterned upon the like subordination during the negotiation of the
collective bargaining agreement. Thus, the Court says, without noting
the distinction between the negotiation of the collective agreement and
the settlement of grievances arising under it:
The collective bargaining system as encouraged by Congress and
administered by the NLRB of necessity subordinates the interests
of an individual employee to the collective interests of all the em-
ployees in a bargaining unitY
7. In fact, the first of these alternatives had been rejected and the second accepted
before Vaca came before the Court. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
8. In practice, it will make little difference whether or not individual control over
personal grievances is made conditional upon the union refusal to process it further, since
there will be few cases in which the employee will assume the burdens of processing his
own case where the union is willing to act on his behalf. But if it can be shown that no
other interest is compromised in the extreme case of the absolute right, then it follows
that none will be compromised in those important, but less extreme, cases where the union
refuses to process further.
9. 386 U.S. at 182.
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The Taft-Hartley Act, like the Wagner Act before it, made any union
which could command the support of a majority of the employees
within a bargaining unit the exclusive bargaining representative of all
the employees. 10 The justification offered for this creation of monopoly
power over contract negotiations,11 with its consequent limitation upon
the individual freedom of contract, 12 is the need for and ability of a sin-
gle bargaining representative to prevent repeated minority strikes and
work stoppages, which could disrupt the work of the unit, reduce output
and generate industrial strife.' 8 But even if such a grant of power to the
union is justified during the negotiation of a collective agreement, the
same reasoning does not justify a similar grant of power in the settle-
ment of individual grievances under that agreement, for the weight at.
tached to the competing interests does not remain unchanged during the
life of the collective agreement. In particular, the employee's interest in
his personal grievance is stronger than his comparable interest in his
control over contractual terms, which is subordinated during the negoti-
ation of the collective agreement. During that negotiation, the rights of
no single employee alone are at stake. Any interest of a particular em-
ployee threatened in these negotiations will not be an interest peculiar to
him but will be shared by a class of workers similarly situated. If that
class of workers believes that its interests are inadequately protected
by the union, it can use collective political action or informal pres-
sure to achieve its contractual objectives, threatening it necessary to
seek the recognition of an independent union with its own bargaining
representative. 4 Where there is only a personal grievance, on the other
10. L.M.R.A. § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964). For text of this section, see p. 576
infra.
11. See Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust
Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 21 (1963), on the uses of monopoly power
by unions. See also Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945), and National
Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
12. See J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 821 U.S. 332 (1944), where it was held that the col-
lective agreement superseded prior valid contracts between the employer and the em-
ployee, even where their terms were more favorable to the employees in question.
13. The theory behind the creation of the exclusive bargaining agent runs into diffl-
culties where the unit of representation does not include all those workers necessary for
the successful operation of the economic unit. See, e.g., In re American Potash & Chemical
Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954), where the economic need for large units was weighed
against the right of craft employees to separate ulion representation under L.MR.A
§ 9(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. 159(b)(2) (1964), and found wanting.
14. One need only witness the special settlement procured by the United Auto Workers
against Ford for its skilled workers, whose discontent with prior collective agreements had
received political expression. N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1967, at 1, col. 2. Political activity by a
minority appears to be ineffective in cases involving a merger of seniority rosters, where
of necessity some workers will lose employment after the merger. The problem here Is
that there is no possible intermediate position that satisfactorily adjusts the claims of the
two conflicting groups, since the question of employment or no, unlike that of compensa.
tion, does not admit of gradations. Under these situations, if the political means fall, the
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hand, the employee affected stands alone, with but limited political
means at his disposal, and at a time when his very livelihood and not
just a question of contractual expectations are at stake. The individual
interest in the enforcement of personal contract rights is, without more,
like any other contract interest, and prima facie it is entitled to the same
legal protection.
Hence, a shift in both the extent of the individual interest and the
non-legal means available to protect it takes place between the negotia-
tion of the collective agreement and the settlement of individual griev-
ances under it. Accordingly, there is reason to question whether the
combined dominance of the employer and the union should continue to
prevail at settlement as it does at negotiation. If it can be shown that no
legitimate competing interest, social or private, is adversely affected by
the recognition of the individual right to process grievances, then it fol-
lows that no denial of that right is justified.
Before this can be done, however, a threshold criticism of the
distinction between the negotiation of the collective agreement and
the settlement of grievances arising under it must be met, since if
that distinction cannot be drawn, then all arguments that depend
upon it must fall as well. Professor Cox has contended that this dis-
tinction is not viable, arguing that every decision has ramifications
for the future course of relationships between the employer and the
union. According to Cox, since each decision has precedential value
for the future determination of like disputes under the contract, the
"[a]djudication of past rights [cannot] be separated from rule making
for the future," because "[b]oth pertain to the interstices of the
contract."' 5
This argument is not persuasive for two reasons. First, since the reso-
lution of most grievances will turn only on factual issues, the doctrine
of precedent will not normally apply. 0 Second, nothing can prevent
aggrieved employees will resort to legal proceedings for redress although their prospects
for success are not bright. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 US. 835 (1904); Britt v. Trail-
mobile Co., 179 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1950). But see Ferro v. Railway Fxpress Agency, Inc.,
296 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1961).
15. Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HAiv. L. RaV. 601, 625 (1956).
See also Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and
Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 Mica. L. REv. 1435, 1475-76 (1963).
Blumrosen begins by characterizing the distinction as "artificial," but appears to accept
its viability after this initial hesitation.
16. Professor Cox acknowledges the force of this point when he notes that disputes
under thousands of collective bargaining agreements
require scant implementation through day-to-day negotiation. Few questions of inter-
pretation can arise, and when they do there is little likelihood of internal competition
among the interests of the different employees in the bargaining unit. Alleged contract
violations turn chiefly on questions of fact; their outcome will have little Iweight
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the union and employer from agreeing to eliminate the precedential
value of all points of law decided in all grievances not processed by
the union. Indeed, even in the absence of such a provision, the union
would not be bound by any determination unless it were a party to
the proceedings in which the determination was made.
II. The Competing Interests Affected by the Individual Control of
Grievances
A. The Social Interest in Industrial Peace
When all that is at stake is a personal grievance of an individual
employee, the threat to industrial peace is not comparable to its coun-
terpart during the negotiation of the collective agreement. Where the
employee processes his own grievance, under any of the alternatives
set out above, neither the union nor the employer will want to use its
economic weapons against the other, for they are in essential agreement
on the proper disposition of the grievance. Hence under any of the
alternatives to the Supreme Court rule, any threat to industrial peace
that lies in the recognition of an individual's right to control his own
grievance must be far more subtle and of far smaller magnitude than that
of the lockout or the strike.17 Whether the right to control the grievance
is given or denied the individual, the only consequence affected is
whether, and in accordance with what rules, the grievance will be
arbitrated, litigated or abandoned. If any of these alternative disposi-
tions of the individual grievance threaten industrial peace, those threats
must stem from the creation of tensions and the impairment of good
working relations within the employee-union-employer matrix. Two
major arguments have been advanced to show that these threats to
industrial peace are sufficient to warrant denying the individual em-
as precedent. Many of these contracts will contain neither a grievance procedure nor
provision for arbitration.
Cox, supra note 15, at 653. These observations apply with equal force to the vast majority
of individual grievances that arise under more complex collective agreements. Certainly
no question of law was presented in the grievance at issue in Vaca.
17. The point here is much the same as the point made by Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) when he
rejected a clear and present danger standard as the test of the government's right to
protect the social interest in national security against an individual's claim to First Amend-
ment freedoms. A clear and present danger test only takes into account the probability of
harm and makes no reference to its expected intensity. "In each case (courts] must ask
whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of
free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 183 F.2d at 212. So here we must consider
not only the probability of a threat to industrial peace but also the extent of disruption
should that threat actually occur.
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ployee control over his own grievance.18 First, it has been argued that
if the individual right to arbitrate is made absolute, so many frivolous
claims will be brought that the grievance machinery will be abandoned
as too costly and inefficient by the only parties that have the power to
establish and maintain it, the union and the employer.10 Second, it is
contended that the use of the grievance machinery by the individual
employee can become a vehicle for the intensification of union rivalry
within the bargaining unit.
1. Frivolous Claims and the Preservation of the Grievance Machinery
In Vaca v. Sipes the Court argued that if an individual right to process
grievances were recognized, individuals would bring so many un-
founded and frivolous claims that the employer and the union would
not find the continued operation of the grievance machinery worth-
while.20 Alternatively, the union might feel compelled to sacrifice its
credibility by pressing to arbitration all manner of frivolous grievances
in order to maintain its position in the unit.21 In either case, the crea-
tion of an individual's right to process his own grievances might increase
the expected cost of the grievance machinery to the employer above its
perceived value to his employees. If so, a rule prohibiting the individual
employee from using the grievance machinery would be necessary to
prevent its abandonment. But even if the fear of frivolous claims is
justified, it does not warrant the rule of Vaca v. Sipes. The recognition
of the right of an individual employee to sue his employer in court
despite his union's good faith in deciding not to take his claim to arbi-
tration could not possibly increase the cost of operating the grievance
machinery.
Indeed, even if the individual seeks the right to insist on arbitration,
the recognition of such a right might not destroy the worth of the
grievance machinery. The record in Vaca v. Sipes strongly suggests
18. The court also makes the argument that union control over grievances gives the
employer and the union the opportunity to resolve differences over the interpretation of
the collective agreement. 886 U.S. at 191. But the resolution of these differences need not
depend upon the presentation of a particular grievance, for the emplo)er and the union
are always free to renegotiate the collective agreement.
19. Thus, the Court: "In providing for a grievance and arbitration procedure which
gives the union discretion to supervise the grievance machinery and to invoke arbitration,
the employer and the union contemplate that each will endeavor in good faith to settle
grievances short of arbitration. Through this settlement process, frivolous grievances are
ended prior to the most costily and time-consuming step in the grievance procedures.
386 U.S. at 191. See also Cox, supra note 15, at 626.
20. See, e.g., Black-Clawson Co. v. International Assn of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179, 186
(2d Cir. 1962).
21. See Cox, supra note 15, at 625-26.
565
The Yale Law Journal
that employees do not regard it in their own interest to press forward
grievances that are without merit. The grievance provisions in the
collective bargaining agreement established a five-stage procedure. In
the first two stages, either the employee personally or the union on his
behalf could take the grievance to the appropriate representative of
the employer.22 Both the employer and the union indicated satisfaction
with the established procedures, because it facilitated the efficient settle-
ment of grievances short of arbitration.2 There was no indication that
employees, who had complete control over their own grievances during
the first two stages of the procedure, abused their rights. To the extent
the employees acted responsibly when given the limited right to press
their grievances without the intervention of the union, it seems reason-
able to believe that they would act reasonably if their rights were
extended. Indeed, there is even less likelihood that employees will
abuse the grievance machinery at its advanced stages, since the costs
which they personally will bear in pursuing their individual grievances
will increase while potential benefits remain unchanged.
Moreover, there are means whereby the costs to the parties can be
reduced significantly without denying the individual's right to process
grievances to arbitration. Once it is settled that the claim will be
brought to arbitration by an employee acting on his own behalf, there
is no need for the grievance to follow its customary course through the
grievance machinery. Where the union has abandoned the grievance,
there is no point in requiring the grievance to be taken through the
customary steps short of arbitration, since both the union and em-
ployer representatives on the grievance panel may well act in concert
to deny the claim for relief.24 And since the disposition of the grievance
need not have any precedential implications for the future course of
union-employer relationships, an arbitration at the local instead of the
national level could lead to a decisive savings in costs without deny-
ing the employee the benefits of an impartial determination of his
grievance. 2
If necessary, additional controls could be imposed to reduce the costs
22. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 175 (1967).
23. Id. at 192. The employer filed an amicus curiae brief supporting the position of the
union. Id. at 172-73.
24. In the third and fourth of the five stages of the grievance machinery in question
in Vaca, union and company officials alone determined the disposition of a grievance.
386 U.S. at 175. See Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbilralion,
37 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 362, 402 (1962), on problems connected with the splection of an arbitra-
tor where a grievance is individually prosecuted.
25. The collective agreement in Taca called for arbitration by a national arbitrator.
386 U.S. at 175.
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of frivolous grievances still further. Thus, the arbitrator could be
empowered to assign the costs of the proceeding. If the individual em-
ployee chose to process his claim without the assistance of the union, or
to pursue it after the union withdrew, he could be required to bear his
proportionate share of the costs. In fact, if his claim is frivolous, he
could be assigned all or part of his employer's costs as well. As an
offset, unions which have declined to press the employee's grievances
could be required to pay his costs should he succeed.
Under such a system there is no reason to believe that the union will
feel compelled to press to arbitration all manner of frivolous complaints.
If the grievance brought by an employee is indeed frivolous, then it
will fail in arbitration, and the union will escape untaxed. Moreover,
the union's credibility will be enhanced-not impaired-where it dem-
onstrates the worth of its judgment by refusing to process a grievance sub-
sequently determined to be frivolous. Finally, if there is still a fear
that petty grievances will be taken to arbitration despite these cost
controls, provision could be made that only serious claims, such as
those stemming from discharges, could be taken by the employee to
arbitration.
Thus, it should be possible to reduce the costs of allowing the indi-
vidual to handle his grievance independently sufficiently to prevent the
grievance machinery from being endangered. Indeed, it can even be
argued with considerable force that the cost of resolving all grievances
may actually be increased by the rule in Vaca v. Sipes. Although the
individual employee cannot now take his case to arbitration without
union assistance, he need not remain inactive when the union abandons
his claim, for he may take both the union and the employer into either
state or federal court under Section 301(a). To institute such an action,
an allegation of the union's bad faith is sufficient. The union or the
employer may seek dismissal of the action by summary judgment
before trial, but they have little prospect of success under the federal
rules and since these cases are governed by federal law, the employee
can always choose the federal forum.20 Given the complexity of the
question of good faith, it is doubtful that either the employer or the
union could get a summary judgment on the strength of supporting
affidavits alone, because the employee can claim in reply that the hostil-
ity of the union raises genuine doubt concerning its good faith. -T More-
26. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
27. See generally 6 J. fooRE, FEDomA PrAcTCE: S 56-17[27]. at 2553-50. (2d ed. 1966).
Since the question of whether to grant summary judgment is so highly factual, no uniform
rule can be laid in advance that covers all cases.
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over, the employee could institute discovery proceedings against the
union or employer, thus at least delaying summary judgment, and even
appeal summary judgment if granted. Even if such a case never gets
to trial, the costs of litigation will far exceed those of arbitration. Of
course it must on the other hand be admitted that employees will to
a degree be deterred from instituting such litigation when their even-
tual chances of success are small.
The hostility of the Supreme Court towards frivolous grievances
brought by individual employees is somewhat puzzling.28 Where an
allegedly frivolous grievance is brought by the union, the employer
cannot resist a court order to arbitrate on the ground that the union
claim is patently unfounded.29 This conclusion is justified on two
grounds: first, that the arbitration of employer-union disputes without
the interference of the courts helps further industrial peace through
the development of self-government within the plant;30 and, second,
that the processing of all grievances, even those seemingly frivolous,
has a "therapeutic" effect upon all concerned.3' These two rationales
apply with equal force to those cases in which the arbitration of a
grievance is sought by an individual employee. But once he, and not
the union, desires the arbitration of the grievance the entire perspective
shifts: arbitration is not encouraged, but forbidden; only litigation is
permitted, and even that is discouraged.
2. Union Rivalry and the Right to Process Grievances
A rule enabling an individual to press his claim to arbitration sup-
posedly endangers industrial peace because it allows rival unions and
dissenting groups within the unit to
28. The fear of the frivolous grievance parallels the fear, once widely held, of the flood
of speculative lawsuits that would overwhelm the courts if actions for nervous shock In the
absence of physical impact were permitted. The rule has been changed in many states
in recent years and the dreaded flood of groundless cases has not materialized. See, e.g.,
Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965), overruling Ward v. West Jersey & SR.R.,
65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900).
29 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). The decision of the
Supreme Court in American Manufacturing rejected the older rule in Association of
Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317, afl'd, 297 N.Y. 519,
74 N.E.2d 464 (1947). "If the meaning of the provision of the contract sought to be
arbitrated is beyond dispute, there cannot be anything to arbitrate, and the contract
cannot be said to provide for arbitration." Id. at 918, 67 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
50. "A collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of self.governinent,"
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960). See generally
Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REv. 999, 1002.09
(1955).
31. Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 RocKY MT. L. Rv.
247, 261 (1958), cited in United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
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press aggressively all manner of grievances, regardless of their merit,
in an effort to squeeze the last drop of competitive advantage out
of each grievance and to use the settlement of even the most trivial
grievance as a vehicle to build up their own prestige. Imaginary
grievances could be conjured up and others which, under ordinary
circumstances, would be dropped at the first step could be mag-
nified out of all proportion to their importance. The settlement of
grievances could become an endless source of friction and compe-
tition and a means for creating and perpetuating employee dis-
satisfaction instead of a method of eliminating it.12
This argument fails. It is based on the assumption that rival unions
will actively intervene in the settlement procedure and disrupt the
orderly course of negotiation between the established union and the
employer, to the detriment of all the parties governed by the collective
agreement. In practice, however, such intervention will rarely occur;
and even where such situations seem likely to arise, they can be pre-
vented without sacrificing the individual employee's right to control
his personal grievance.
Although a rival union might intervene actively in the grievance pro-
cedure if the individual could process his grievance independently, the
number of instances in which there are union rivalries within the unit
is probably small. At best, then, the rule in Vaca takes a condition ad-
mittedly infrequent and treats it as the norm for determining rules to
govern the processing of grievances under all circumstances. Moreover,
one could prevent the disruption of settled grievance procedures by
more selective means than denying all individual relief in cases in
which the union has acted in good faith. First, the employee could be
granted the right to litigate but denied the right to arbitrate. By re-
quiring the employee to litigate his claim in court, the law could
preserve the grievance machinery for use solely in those cases in which
the claim was brought by the representative union.3 Alternatively, if
it is thought to be desirable to preserve the individual's access to arbi-
tration, any rival unions could be forbidden to give either financial
or legal assistance to any aggrieved employee. Indeed, such a rule could
easily be inferred from the right of the representative union to be the
exclusive bargaining agent within the unit.
Thus, individual control over personal grievances need not lead to
32. Douglas Aircraft Co., 25 War Lab. Rep. 57, 64-65 (1945). cited in Cox, supra note
15, at 626. The Supreme Court, which relies on Professor Cox's article, 386 US. at 191,
does not rely on this particular argument.
53. The Court misses the point when it speaks of the absolute right to arbitrate as
though it were the only alternative to the rule it laid down. 3M5 US. at 191-93.
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an intensification or creation of union rivalry. Indeed, there are
grounds for believing that statutory rules guaranteeing such a right
may actually reduce the intensity of such rivalry by eliminating a
potentially burning issue from inter-union competition. The recogni-
tion of an individual's right to process grievances may also lessen
rivalry by reducing the individual's dependence on his bargaining rep-
resentative, and concomitantly his concern over the representative
selected.
B. Competing Private Interests
However, it may still be argued that the recognition of such a right
would endanger one or more private interests significantly. But when
these supposed competing private interests are examined in detail, the
danger to them proves small or nugatory.
1. The Union Interest
Individual control over personal grievances would affect union
interests in two ways. First, it would reduce the power of the union over
the employees it represents by diminishing their dependence on the
union. Second, it could create situations in which the employer and
the employee could engage in conduct inimical to the interests of the
union.
As we have already seen, the smaller the control of the union over
the grievance, the less dependent upon its services are its men. Although
the union thus has an interest in controlling the grievance machinery,
this fact does not imply that it should have that control as a matter of
right, even if it acts in good faith.34 A union is a means and not an
end in the scheme of labor relations. It should control the grievance
machinery only so long as it provides its members with benefits which
they could not achieve through individual efforts. In short, the test
is not good faith, but performance, and there is no reason to believe
that union members should not be allowed to judge that performance
themselves. Where the union handles the grievance machinery prop-
erly, its members will rarely assume the extra hazards and costs of
34. In Vaca the Court does not address itself to the question of the legitimacy of the
union's interest, when it says: "the settlement process [in which the union has control
over the grievance machinery] furthers the interest of the union as statutory agent and
as coauthor of the bargaining agreement in representing the employees in the enforce-
ment of the agreement." 386 U.S. at 191. Mr. Justice Black makes this point in his dissent:
"I simply fail to see how the union's legitimate role as statutory agent is undermined by
requiring it to prosecute all serious grievances to a conclusion or by allowing the Injured
employee to sue his employer after he has given the union a chance to act on his behalf."
386 U.S. at 209-10 (emphasis added).
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exercising their individual right to act independently of the union.
Only those unions of questionable competence, and therefore of ques-
tionable worth, need fear the recognition of this individual right.
Admittedly, however, in the determination of grievances brought by
individual employees, questions which affect the legitimate interests
of the union may arise. Since the union may have to bear costs if the
individual successfully processes his grievance over its refusal, it has a
financial stake in its resolution. Indeed, absent the union, the employer
might even offer the employee favorable terms of settlement on condi-
tion that he agree to oppose the union. Alternatively, the employee may
seek to defend himself by alleging that his union told him that his
conduct was proper under the terms of the collective agreement. In
all such cases, the union should be permitted to be present during
settlement. The need for the union to be present may only arise inEre-
quently, yet no harm is done in permitting the union to be present
at the settlement, arbitration, or litigation to guard its interests if it so
chooses. But, although the union's interest in the grievance procedure
appears to warrant its right to be present in settlement meetings be-
tween the employer and the employee, these interests do not justify a
grant of exclusive control, limited only by the requirements of good
faith.
2. The Employer Interest
It may be assumed that the number of cases in which an employee
recovers against his employer would be increased where tie right in
question is recognized. Clearly, however, the employer has no right to
be released from the duty of paying damages for his breaches of con-
tract. The only increases in cost in which the employer has a legitimate
interest are the legal and administrative expenses he will have to bear
if any alternative to Vaca v. Sipes were adopted. As we have seen, there
is good reason to believe that such costs would not be substantial, par-
ticularly when compared with the costs the employer may incur in
litigation under the rule of Vaca v. Sipes. Moreover, the employer's
costs under the right to arbitration alternative to Vaca will be reduced
by the amount that the arbitrator taxes employees who bring frivolous
grievances. Finally, to the extent the employer controls the negotiation
of the collective agreement, he will be able to pass some of the remain-
ing costs on to his employees by reducing the value of the package
offered. It seems fair, then, to conclude that the employer has at most
only a modest legitimate financial interest in the decision to grant the
individual employee control over his own grievance.
571
The Yale Law Journal
The employer interest in the form of the remedy is more substantial.
In his relations with the union, the employer is treated in accordance
with the traditional law of private contracts to the extent that he is
not required to arbitrate unless he has so agreed. Admittedly, the pre-
sumption in favor of arbitration that usually holds in labor cases runs
contrary to the general rule on arbitrability,35 but even that presump-
tion will not serve to create an agreement to arbitrate out of whole
cloth. Hence it may well be that the employer should not be required
to arbitrate in the absence of his promise to do so.
3. The Interest of Other Employees in a Personal Grievance
Where there is a personal grievance of a single employee, no other
employee has a substantial financial interest in the resolution of that
grievance, regardless of whether a personal remedy is provided by arbi-
tration or litigation. Where the employee processes his own grievance,
the costs to the other employees in the unit promises to be less than
those involved in those cases in which the union itself processes the
grievance. If the grievance is brought without a request for the assis-
tance of the union, the union and the employees it represents will at
most bear the costs of observation if it chooses to be present during
the adjustment of the grievance. Where the union chooses not to process
the grievance, the other employees will only bear the costs of the
aggrieved employee if he is successful. By contrast, the employees of
the unit will always bear all the costs when the union itself processes
the grievance, regardless of its merit. Moreover, under a system which
permitted individual control over grievances, the incidence of fair
representation suits against the union would doubtless drop, given
the comparative attractiveness of the contractual remedy against the
employer, and hence the costs to other employees in the defense of
these suits could be passed back to the members of the unit either in
the form of reduced dues or increased benefits.
Accordingly, if there is a substantial financial burden to other em-
ployees in the personal control of grievances, it must stem from the
ability of the employer to pass on his increased costs-either of settle-
ment or administration-by reducing their benefits under the collec-
tive agreement. Since the employer does not unilaterally dictate the
terms of the agreement, he will be able to pass these costs on only
in part. Moreover, the costs in question must be measured against the
35. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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costs which the employer could pass on when the aggrieved employee
litigates under the rule in Vaca v. Sipes.
Finally, even if there were increased costs to the other employees in
the unit, these would be offset by the value to them of the contingent
right to pursue their individual grievances independently should they
ever wish to do so.
III. The Resolution of the Conflicting Interests
On the basis of this analysis, the interest of the aggrieved employee
in the control of his personal grievance remains the only interest that
is both legitimate and substantial. Therefore the individual employee
should be provided with a remedy in every case in which his con-
tractual interests are invaded. The Supreme Court itself seems to
recognize implicitly the force of this conclusion. Thus, it wrote in
Taca:
[T]he employer has committed a wrongful discharge in breach of
[the collective] agreement, a breach which could be remedied
through the grievance process to the employee-plaintiff's benefit
were it not for the union's breach of its statutory duty of fair
representation to the employee. To leave the employee remediless
in such circumstances would, in our opinion, be a great injustice.
We cannot believe that Congress, in conferring upon employers
and unions the power to establish exclusive grievance procedures,
intended to confer upon unions such unlimited discretion to de-
prive injured employees of all remedies for breach of contract.
Nor do we think that Congress intended to shield employers from
the natural consequences of their breaches of bargaining agree-
ments by wrongful union conduct in the enforcement of such
agreements.38
Measured against its own standards, the result reached in Vaca v.
Sipes is defective. Is there not an injustice in leaving an employee
remediless against his employer when there has been a breach of con-
tract merely because there has been no breach of the duty of fair
representation by the union? The union may have been mistaken
in its evaluation of the grievance, but that is no reason to immunize
the employer from liability for his admitted breach. Worse still the
union could have negligently evaluated the individual claim. To deny
the employee under such circumstances would be precisely to "shield
employers from the natural consequences of their breaches.., by the
56. 586 U.S. at 185-86. See also Cox, supra note 15, at 652.
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wrongful union conduct in the enforcement of [the collective] agree.
ment,"37 unless one chooses not to regard negligent conduct as wrongful
because it is not willfully so.
Again, the rule in Vaca v. Sipes appears to deny an employee his
just remedy where the union decides 'that it will not process the indi-
vidual grievance because it is in conflict with other interests of the
union.38 Thus the union may decide that it does not wish to take the
grievance further because it has reasonable doubts as to its ultimate
success and does not wish to incur the expense of arbitration. Or the
union may choose to yield on one grievance in order to encourage the
settlement of others.3 9 Alternatively, the union may choose not to
process the grievance for fear that it will jeopardize its position on
some matter of greater union concern. In all of these cases the union
has weighed one interest against another, only to reject the individual
claim.
Even if the employee believes that he is entitled to a remedy under
the rigid limitations of Vaca, he must still overcome difficult problems
of proof in order to prevail. Under the law prior to Vaca v. Sipes, an
employee could not maintain his action for breach of contract against
the employer unless he could show that he had attempted to process
his claim under the grievance machinery established by the collective
agreement.40 But in Vaca the crucial condition for the contractual
remedy is no longer the attempt by the employee to use the grievance
machinery but the union's bad faith in deciding not to process the
grievance. Although the employee can easily prove that he has at-
tempted to utilize the grievance machinery, proof of bad faith involves
a demonstration of the purpose and intent underlying the union's
decision about which reliable information is notoriously difficult to
obtain.
Thus it appears that the rule in Vaca v. Sipes does not afford ade-
quate protection to the individual employee, particularly in light of
the weakness of the competing private claims for protection. Nor can
the rule of the Court be justified on the ground that under the collec-
tive agreement the individual employee has delegated all of his reme-
37. 586 U.S. at 186. Mr. Justice Black, in dissent, makes precisely this point. 386 U.S.
at 205.
38. See Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 80-81, 190 A.2d 825, 885-36 (1963),
where the conflict of interest is made the test of fair representation, unless the union fairly
prosecutes the grievance at the request of the employee.
39. The attitude is "give a little, take a little." Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair
Representation: Federal Responsibility In a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1386 (1958).
40. Republic Steel Co. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
574
Vol. 77: 559, 1968
Vaca v. Sipes
dial rights to his union as his sole agent, and thus has no ground to
complain unless that agent, the union, has acted in bad faith. If the
union is to be the employee's agent in processing his individual griev-
ances, some particular designation of agency should be required. Since
a collective agreement may bind a worker in the unit even though he
did not support its adoption, it cannot be said to constitute an appoint-
ment of the union as general agent, much less a specific appointment
for the purpose of processing grievances. Once the union has decided
not to take the grievance further, it cannot be regarded as an agent of
the employee since it is acting contrary to his interests and instructions.
At this point, the union is a mere stranger to the contract, whose com-
pliance with the duty of fair representation is immaterial to the em-
ployee's action on the contract.41 A system, then, which permits the
union as the recipient of monopoly power to conclude agreements
which make it the exclusive custodian of individual remedies is open
to serious challenge. The grant of monopoly power to the union can
only be justified to the extent that it serves the need to preserve indus-
trial peace. Since, as we have seen, industrial peace is not furthered by
an extension of monopoly power from the negotiation of the collective
agreement to its enforcement, the union should not be permitted to
acquire through contract exclusive control over employee grievances.
Nor, as the Supreme Court suggested, can Vaca v. Sipes be justified
by the fact that collective agreements usually give unions control over
the grievance machinery as a matter of right. According to the Court,
this industrial practice is relevant under Section 203(d) of the Labor
Management Relations Act, which provides: "Final adjustment by a
method agreed upon by the parties themselves is ... the desirable
method for settlement of grievance disputes arising out of the appli-
cation of the collective agreement."4 3
Admittedly, collective agreements are a source of law for labor
relations, but they are not the only source. Such agreements are solely
the products of bargaining between the employer and the union, and,
in the absence of public control, will reflect only their combined in-
terests. Both the union and the employer have an interest, if not one
worthy of protection, in preventing the employee from pressing his
grievance independently, and will protect that interest by providing
41. Mr. Justice Black dearly regards this characterization of the union as a stranger
to the contract of hire as both proper and final, and appears to find no justification even
for union presence at settlement Thus he speaks of the individual employee's suit as a
suit "for the simple breach of his employment contract." 386 U.S. at 203 (emphasis added).
42. See Cox, supra note 15, at 631.
43. L.M.R.A. § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964).
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for exclusive union control over the grievance machinery in their col-
lective agreement. They cannot be expected to yield gratuitously to a
third party not present in their negotiations, even where that third
party has a direct and legitimate interest in the outcome. Since the
forces of self-interest, imperfectly mirrored in the negotiation of the
collective agreement, do not adequately protect the interests of the
individual employee, the union and employer must be prevented from
denying the employee access to the grievance machinery by statutory
intervention.
This conclusion is not inconsistent with Section 203(d), which is but
one of a series of provisions dealing with the role of the Federal Media-
tion and Conciliation Service.44 This context indicates that Congress
was concerned in this provision only with the massive social disruptions
that could occur when the union stands pitted en masse against the
employer. Thus Section 203(c) provides that "If the Director [of the
Service] is not able to bring the parties to agreement by the conciliation
within a reasonable time, he shall seek to induce the parties volun-
tarily to seek other means of settling the dispute without resort to
strike, lockout or other coercion ....,, Since the parties referred to
throughout are the union and the employer alone, the provision has
no application to tripartite problems where personal rights which do
not endanger industrial peace are at stake.
The final irony of Vaca v. Sipes is that a desirable solution to the
question of individual rights probably could have been reached
through the words of Section 9(a) of the Labor Management Relations
Act, which was completely ignored by the Court:
Representatives designated or elected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate
for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual em-
ployee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to
present such grievances to their employer and to have such griev-
ances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining repre-
sentative, so long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the
terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in
effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has
been given the opportunity to be present at such adjustment.40
44. L.M.RA. § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 173 (1964).
45. L.M.RA. § 203(c), 29 U.S.C. § 173(c) (1964).
46. L.M.R.A. § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
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The provision can be read, according to its plain meaning,47 to pro-
vide a solution consistent with the results of interest analysis made in
this note. Section 9(a) accepts the distinction between the negotiation
of the collective agreement and the settlement of grievances arising
under that agreement consistent with its terms. It gives the employee
the right to take his grievance to his employer "at any time" and
"without the intervention" of his union. The union, for its part, is
granted the limited right-consistent with its limited interest-to be
present at the resolution of employee grievances. The direct relief
afforded an employee against his employer is not only consistent with
this section but indeed may be required by it, and if so the bad faith
of the union is immaterial to the determination of rights between the
employee and his employer. On the other hand, the statute is less clear
on the form than on the nature of the remedy to be afforded to the
individual employee in those cases in which informal adjustment fails.
Indeed, even if arbitration is regarded as preferable in cases of indi-
vidual grievances for those same reasons which give it preferred status
in disputes between the union and the employer, it does not appear to
be the remedy envisoned by Section 9(a).48 One could attempt to read
into the words "have such grievances adjusted" a requirement that
the adjustment be by arbitration where the grievance machinery pro-
vides for it at the option of the union.49 On the other hand, such a re-
quirement would make the employer settle a grievance through a
procedure to which he had not agreed in the contract. It could hardly
47. See Cox, supra note 15, at 624, where Hohfeld's theory of rights is invoked in an
attempt to undermine the plain meaning of the first proviso to Section 9(a). Hohfeld's
distinction between a strict right on the one hand and a privilege on the other, IV. Hou-
FELD, FuNDA LENTAL LEGAL CocEtrnoNs, 26-50 (1923), is seized upon by Professor Cox,
who argues that the statute uses the term "right" in a loose, non-technical sense of "privi-
lege." Such an interpretation, he claims, is consistent with the purpose of the proviso,
which was designed to permit the employer to deal directly with an aggrieved employee
without fear of committing an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)5. See General
Electric Co., 150 NI.R.B. 192, 200 (1964) (concurring opinion). But the construction of
this proviso turns on more than the distinction between a "right" and a "privilege." The
crucial question must be whose rights and whose privileges are at stake. Even if the term
"right" is taken to mean Hohfeldian "privilege," the privilege must still be that of the
employee, and not his employer. The force of Professor Cox's argument thus is that the
"employee has the [privilege] at any time . . . " which is hardly language that supports
the conclusion that individual remedies for breach of contract by the employer are con-
ditioned upon a breach of the duty of fair representation by his union. It matters not
that the proviso may have been passed to protect employer interests, for such an interest
could be served by a grant of rights to the employee. See Summers, supra note 24, at 362,
576-85, for a more generous and more literal reading of Section 9(a).
48. See p. 568 supra; Hughes Tool Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 981, 982-83 (1944); enforced as
modified, Hughes Tool Co. v. N.L.R.B. 147 F.2d 69, 73 (5th Cir. 1945).
49. See also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), where the
Court with less apparent justification read a preference for arbitration into the text of
Section 501(a).
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be expected that an individual employee should be granted the right
to arbitrate when he would not have that privilege if the union pro-
cessed his grievance on his behalf. Absent specific language in the
statute, therefore, it seems that the employee should be returned to
the position he would have enjoyed had there been no union and no
grievance machinery. Unless he can obtain a specific agreement from
the employer to arbitrate, he will be thrown back upon his judicial
remedy.
But disagreements on the proper form of the remedy do not weaken
the criticisms of the substantive rule in Vaca v. Sipes, for in that case
the employee demonstrated his willingness to pursue judicial remedies
against both his employer and his union. Had the Court properly
assessed the weight of the competing interests involved, it would not
have presumptively vested the union with exclusive control over the
grievance machinery. Rather it would have recognized, at the very
least, the right of the employee to gain judicial redress, unimpeded by
requirements of the proof of bad faith, of contractual wrongs suffered
by him.
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